Anderson, J.P. (1972). Computer Security Technology Planning Study Volume II, ESD-TR-73-51, Vol. II. Bedford, MA: Electronic Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command, Hanscom Field. Available at: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/history/ande72.pdf (Date of access: August 1, 2004).
Bell, D.D. and L.J. La Padula (1974). Secure Computer System: Unified Exposition and Multics Interpretation, ESD-TR-75-306. Bedford, MA: ESD/AFSC, Hanscom AFB. Available at: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/history/bell76.pdf (Date of access: August 1, 2004).
accreditation - approval granted to a computer system to perform a critical, defense-related application. The accreditation is usually granted by a senior military commander.
assurance - a set of processes, tests, and analyses performed on a computing system to ensure that it fulfills its most critical operating and security requirements.
Despite the failures and frustrations that have dogged MLS product developments for the past quarter century, end users still call for MLS capabilities. This is because the problem remains: the defense community needs to share information at multiple security levels. Most of the community solves the problem by working on multilevel data in a system high environment and dealing with downgrading problems on a piecemeal basis. While this solves the problem in some situations, it isn't practical others, like sensor to shooter applications.
As computer costs fell and performance soared during the 1980s and 1990s, computer networks became essential for sharing work and resources. Long before computers were routinely wired to the Internet, sites were building local area networks to share printers and files. In the defense community, multilevel data sharing had to be addressed in a networking environment. Initially, the community embraced networks of cheap computers as a way to temporarily sidestep the MLS problem. Instead of tackling the problem of data sharing, many organizations simply deployed separate networks to operate at different security levels, each running in system high mode.
Members of the defense community identified the need for MLS-capable systems in the 1960s, and a few vendors implemented the basic features (Weissman 1969, Hoffman 1973, Karger and Schell 1974). However, government studies of the MLS problem emphasized the danger of relying on large, opaque operating systems to protect really valuable secrets (Ware 1970, Anderson 1972). Operating systems were already notorious for unreliability, and these reports highlighted the threat of a software bug allowing leaks of highly sensitive information. The recommended solution was to achieve high assurance through extensive analysis, review, and testing.
Many businesses and organizations need to protect secret information, and most can tolerate some leakage. Organizations who use MLS systems tolerate no leakage at all. Businesses may face legal or financial risks if they fail to protect business secrets, but they can generally recover afterwards by paying to repair the damage. At worst, the business goes bankrupt. Managers who take risks with business secrets might lose their jobs if secrets are leaked, but they are more likely to lose their jobs to failed projects or overrun budgets. This places a limit on the amount of money a business will invest in data secrecy.
I wrote the following message as part of a discussion on the old Firewalls mailing list in 1996. The message was part of a discussion on the use of MLS technology to protect Internet servers from attack. The basic concepts still apply in some ways, though the threats have evolved in many other ways.
The one-time pad is the only encryption technique that has been mathematically proven to be uncrackable. While hard to use, it has often been the choice for highly sensitive traffic. Soviet spies used one-time pads in the 1940s and -50s. The Washington-Moscow "hot line" also uses one-time pads. However, the technique is hard to use correctly.