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The MLS Problem

Many businesses and organizations need to protect secret information, and most can tolerate some leakage. Organizations who use MLS systems tolerate no leakage at all. Businesses may face legal or financial risks if they fail to protect business secrets, but they can generally recover afterwards by paying to repair the damage. At worst, the business goes bankrupt. Managers who take risks with business secrets might lose their jobs if secrets are leaked, but they are more likely to lose their jobs to failed projects or overrun budgets. This places a limit on the amount of money a business will invest in data secrecy.

 

The defense community, which includes the military services, intelligence organizations, related government agencies, and their supporting enterprises, cannot easily recover from certain information leaks. Stealth systems aren't stealthy if the targets know what to look for, and surveillance systems don't see things if the targets know what camouflage to use. Such failures can't always be corrected just by spending more money. Even worse, a system's weakness might not be detected until after a diplomatic or military disaster reveals it. During the Cold War, the threat of nuclear annihilation led military and political leaders to take such risks very seriously. It was easy to argue that data leakage could threaten a country's very existence. The defense community demanded levels of computer security far beyond what the business community needed.

We use the term multilevel because the defense community has classified both people and information into different levels of trust and sensitivity. These levels represent the well-known security classifications: Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret. Before people are allowed to look at classified information, they must be granted individual clearances that are based on individual investigations to establish their trustworthiness. People who have earned a Confidential clearance are authorized to see Confidential documents, but they are not trusted to look at Secret or Top Secret information any more than any member of the general public. These levels form the simple hierarchy shown in Figure 1. The dashed arrows in the figure illustrate the direction in which the rules allow data to flow: from "lower" levels to "higher" levels, and not vice versa.

The hierarchical security levels
Figure 1: The hierarchical security levels

When speaking about these levels, we use three different terms:

  • Clearance level indicates the level of trust given to a person with a security clearance, or a computer that processes classified information, or an area that has been physically secured for storing classified information. The level indicates the highest level of classified information to be stored or handled by the person, device, or location.
  • Classification level indicates the level of sensitivity associated with some information, like that in a document or a computer file. The level is supposed to indicate the degree of damage the country could suffer if the information is disclosed to an enemy.
  • Security level is a generic term for either a clearance level or a classification level.

The defense community was the first and biggest customer for computing technology, and computers were still very expensive when they became routine fixtures in defense organizations. However, few organizations could afford separate computers to handle information at every different level: they had to develop procedures to share the computer without leaking classified information to uncleared (or insufficiently cleared) users. This was not as easy as it might sound. Even when people "took turns" running the computer at different security levels (a technique called periods processing), security officers had to worry about whether Top Secret information may have been left behind in memory or on the operating system's hard drive. Some sites purchased computers to dedicate exclusively to highly classified work, despite the cost, simply because they did not want to take the risk of leaking information.

Multiuser systems, like the early timesharing systems, made such sharing particularly challenging. Ideally, people with Secret clearances should be able to work at the same time others were working on Top Secret data, and everyone should be able to share common programs and unclassified files. While typical operating system mechanisms could usually protect different user programs from one another, they could not prevent a Confidential or Secret user from tricking a Top Secret user into releasing Top Secret information via a Trojan horse.

A Trojan horse is software that performs an invisible function that the user would not have chosen to perform. For example, consider a multiuser system in which users have stored numerous private files and have used the system's access permissions to protect those files from prying eyes. Imagine that the author of a locally-developed word processing program has an unhealthy curiosity about others in the user community and wishes to read their protected files. The author can install a Trojan horse function in the word processing program to retrieve the protected files. The function copies a user's private files into the author's own directory whenever a user runs the word processing program.

Unfortunately, this is not a theoretical threat. The "macro" function in modern word processors like Microsoft Word allow users to create arbitrarily complicated software procedures and attach them to word processing documents. When another user opens a document containing the macro, the word processor executes the procedure defined by the macro. This was the basis of "macro viruses" like the "I Love You" virus of the late 1990s. A macro can perform all the functions required of a Trojan horse program, including copying files.

When a user runs the word processing program, the program inherits that user's access permissions to the user's own files. Thus the Trojan horse circumvents the access permissions by performing its hidden function when the unsuspecting user runs it. This is true whether the function is implemented in a macro or embedded in the word processor itself. Viruses and network worms are Trojan horses in the sense that their replication logic is run under the context of the infected user. Occasionally, worms and viruses may include an additional Trojan horse mechanism that collects secret files from their victims. If the victim of a Trojan horse is someone with access to Top Secret information on a system with lesser-cleared users, then there's nothing on a conventional system to prevent leakage of the Top Secret information. Multiuser systems clearly need a special mechanism to protect multilevel data from leakage.

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Multiuser Operating Modes

In the United States, the defense community usually describes a multiuser system as operating in a particular mode. For the purposes of this discussion, there are three important operating modes:

  • Dedicated mode - all users currently on the system have permission to access any of the data on the system. In dedicated mode, the computer itself does not need any built-in access control mechanisms if locked doors or other physical mechanisms prevent unauthorized users from accessing it.
  • System high mode - all users currently on the system have the right security clearance to access any data on the system, but not all users have a need to know all data. If users don't need to know some of the data, then the system must have mechanisms to restrict their access. This requires the typical file access mechanisms of typical multiuser systems.
  • Multilevel mode - Not all users currently on the system are cleared for all data stored on the system. The system must have an access control mechanism that enforces MLS restrictions. It must also have a mechanisms to enforce multiuser file access restrictions.

The phrase "need to know" refers to a commonly-enforced rule in organizations that handle classified information. In general, a security clearance does not grant blanket permission to look at all information classified at that level or below. The clearance is really only the first step: people are only allowed to look at classified information that they need to know as part of the work they do.

In other words, if we give Janet a Secret clearance to work on a cryptographic device, then she has a need to know the Secret information related to that device. She does not have permission to study Secret information about spy satellites, or Secret cryptographic information that doesn't apply to her device. If she is using a multiuser system containing Secret information about her project, other cryptographic projects, and even spy satellites, then the system must prevent Janet from browsing information belonging to the other projects and activities. On the other hand, the system should be able to grant Janet permission to look at other materials if she really needs the information to do her job.

A computer's operating mode determines what access control mechanisms it needs. Dedicated systems might not require any mechanisms beyond physical security. Computers running at system high must have user-based access restrictions like those typically provided in Unix and in "professional" versions of Microsoft Windows. In multilevel mode, the system must prevent data from higher security levels from leaking to users who have lower clearances: this requires a special mechanism.

Typically, an MLS mechanism works as follows: Users, computers, and networks carry computer-readable labels to indicate security levels. Data may flow from "same level" to "same level" or from "lower level" to "higher level" (Figure 2). Thus, Top Secret users can share data with one another, and a Top Secret user can retrieve information from a Secret user. It does not allow data from Top Secret (a higher level) to flow into a file or other location visible to a Secret user (at a lower level). If data is not subject to classification rules, it belongs to the "Unclassified" security level. On a computer this would include most application programs and any computing resources shared by all users.

Data flows allowed by an MLS mechanism
Figure 2: Data flows allowed by an MLS mechanism

A direct implementation of such a system allows the author of a Top Secret report to retrieve information entered by users operating at Secret or Confidential and merge it with Top Secret information. The user with the Secret clearance cannot "read up" to see the Top Secret result, since the data only flows in one direction between Secret and Top Secret. Unclassified data can be made visible to all users.

It isn't enough to simply prevent users with lower clearances from reading data carrying higher classifications. What if a user with a Top Secret clearance stores some Top Secret data in a file readable by a Secret user? This causes the same problem as "reading up" since it makes the Top Secret data visible to the Secret user. Some may argue that Top Secret users should be trusted not to do such a thing. In fact, some would argue that they would never do it because it's a violation of the Espionage Act. Unfortunately, this argument does not take into account the risk of a Trojan horse.

For example, Figure 3 shows what could happen if an attacker inserts a macro function with a Trojan horse capability into a word processing file. The attacker has stored the macro function in a Confidential file and has told a Top Secret user to examine the file. When the user opens the Confidential file, the macro function starts running, and it tries to copy files from the Top Secret user's directory into Confidential files belonging to the attacker. This is called "writing down" the data from a higher security level to a lower one.

A macro function with a Trojan horse

Figure 3: A macro function with a Trojan horse could leak data to a lower security level

In a system with typical access control mechanisms, the macro will succeed since the attacker can easily set up all of the permissions needed to allow the Top Secret user to write data into the other user's files. Clearly, the system cannot enforce MLS reliably if Trojan horse programs can circumvent MLS protections. There is no way users can avoid Trojan horse programs with 100% reliability, as suggested by the success of e-mail viruses. An effective MLS mechanism needs to block "write down" attempts as well as "read up" attempts.

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Bell-LaPadula Model

The most widely recognized approach to MLS is the Bell-LaPadula security model (Bell and La Padula, 1974). The model effectively captures the essentials of the access restrictions implied by conventional military security levels. Most MLS mechanisms implement Bell-LaPadula or a close variant of it. Although Bell-LaPadula has accurately defined a MLS capability that keeps data safe, it has not led to the widespread development of successful multilevel systems. In practice, developers have not been able to produce MLS mechanisms that work reliably with high confidence, and some important defense applications require a "write down" capability that renders Bell-LaPadula irrelevant (for example, see the later section "Sensor to Shooter").

In the Bell-LaPadula model, programs and processes (called subjects) try to transfer information via files, messages, I/O devices, or other resources in the computer system (called objects). Each subject and object carries a label containing its security level, that is, the subject's clearance level or the object's classification level. In the simplest case, the security levels are arranged in a hierarchy as shown earlier in Figure 1. More elaborate cases involve compartments, as described in a later section.

The Bell-LaPadula model enforces MLS access restrictions by implementing two simple rules: the simple security property and the *-property. When a subject tries to read from or write to an object, the system compares the subject's security label with the object's label and applies these rules. Unlike typical access restrictions on multiuser computing systems, these restrictions are mandatory: no users on the system can turn them off or bypass them. Typical multiuser access restrictions are discretionary, that is, they can be enabled or disabled by system administrators and often by individual users. If users, or even administrative users, can modify the access rules, then a Trojan horse can modify or even disable those rules. To prevent leakage by browsing users and Trojan horses, the Bell-LaPadula systems always enforce the two properties.

Simple Security Property:

A subject can read from an object as long as the subject's security level is the same as, or higher than, the object's security level. This is sometimes called the no read up property.

*-Property:

A subject can write to an object as long as the subject's security level is the same as or lower than the object's security level. This is sometimes called the no write down property.

The simple security property is obvious: it prevents people (or their processes) from reading data whose classification exceeds their security clearances. Users can't "read up" relative to their security clearances. They can "read down," which means that they can read data classified at or below the same level as their clearances.

The *-property prevents people with higher clearances from passing highly classified data to users who don't share the appropriate clearance, either accidentally or intentionally. User programs can't "write down" into files that carry a lower security level than the process they are currently running. This prevents Trojan horse programs from secretly leaking highly classified data. Figure 4 illustrates these properties: the dashed arrows show data being read in compliance with the simple security property, and the lower solid arrow shows an attempted "write down" being blocked by the *-property.

If the program can read Top Secret, it can\'t write lower levels
Figure 4: If the program can read Top Secret data, it can't write data to a lower level

A system enforcing the Bell-LaPadula model blocks the word processing macro in either of two ways, depending on the security level at which the user runs the word processing program. In one case, shown in Figure 4, the user runs the program at Top Secret. This allows the macro to read the user's Top Secret files, but the *-property prevents the macro from writing to the attacker's Confidential files. When the process tries to open a Confidential file for writing, the MLS access rules prevent it. In the other case, the Top Secret user runs the program at the Confidential level, since the file is classified Confidential. The program's macro function can read and modify Confidential files, including files set up by the attacker, but the simple security property prevents the macro from reading any Secret or Top Secret files.

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Compartments

Although the hierarchical security levels like Top Secret are familiar to most people, they are not the only restrictions placed on information in the defense community. Organizations apply hierarchical security levels (Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret) to their data according to the damage that might be caused by leaking that data. Some organizations add other markings to classified material to further restrict its distribution. These markings go by many names: compartments, codewords, caveats, categories, and so on, and they serve many purposes. In some cases, the markings indicate whether or not the data may be shared with particular organizations, enterprises, or allied countries. In many cases these markings give the data's creator or owner more control over the data's distribution. Each marking indicates another restriction placed on the distribution of a particular classified data item. People can only receive the classified data if they comply with all restrictions placed on the data's distribution.

The Bell-LaPadula model refers to all of these additional markings as compartments. A security level may include compartment identifiers in addition to a hierarchical security level. If a particular file's security level includes one or more compartments, then the user's security level must also include those compartments or the user won't be allowed to read the file.

A system with compartments generally acquires a large number of distinct security levels: one for every legal combination of a hierarchical security level with zero or more compartments. The interrelationships between these levels form a directed graph called a lattice. Figure 5 shows the lattice for a system that contains Secret and Top Secret information with compartments Ace and Bar.

The arrows in the lattice show which security levels can read data labeled with other security levels. If the user Cathy has a Top Secret clearance with access to both compartments Ace and Bar, then she has permission to read any data on the system (assuming its owner has also given her "read" permission to that data). We determine the access rights associated with other security labels by following arrows in Figure 5.

Lattice for Secret, Top Secret, and compartments
Figure 5: Lattice for Secret and Top Secret including the compartments Ace and Bar

If Cathy runs a program with the label Secret Ace, then the program can read data labeled Unclassified, Secret, or Secret Ace. The program can't read data labeled Secret Bar or Secret Ace Bar, since its security label doesn't contain the Bar compartment. Figure 4 illustrates this: there is no path to Secret Ace that comes from a label containing the Bar compartment. Likewise, the program can't read Top Secret data because it is running at the Secret level, and no Top Secret labels lead to Secret labels.

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MLS and System Privileges

A high security clearance like Cathy's shows that a particular organization is willing to trust Cathy with certain types of classified information. It is not a blank check that grants access to every resource on a computer system. MLS access rules always work in conjunction with the system's other access rules.

Systems that enforce MLS access rules always combine them with conventional, user-controlled access permissions. If a Secret or Confidential user blocks access to a file by other users, then a Top Secret user can't read the file either. The "need to know" rule means that classified information should only be shared among individuals who genuinely need the information. Individual users are supposed to keep classified information protected from arbitrary browsing by other users. Higher security clearances do not grant permission to arbitrarily browse: access is still restricted by the need to know requirement.

Users who have Top Secret and higher clearances don't automatically acquire administrative or "super user" status on multilevel computer systems, even if they are cleared for everything on the computer. In a way, the Top Secret security level actually restricts what the user can do: a program running at Top Secret can't install an unclassified application program, for example. Many administrative tasks, like installing application programs and other shared resources, must take place at the unclassified level. If an administrator installs programs while running at the Top Secret level, then the programs will be installed with Top Secret labels. Users with lower clearances wouldn't be authorized to see the programs.

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Limitations in MLS Mechanisms

Despite strong support from the military community and a strong effort by computing vendors and computer security researchers, MLS mechanisms failed to provide the security and functionality required by the defense community. First, security researchers and MLS system developers found it to be extremely difficult, and perhaps impossible, to completely prevent information flow between different security levels in an MLS system. We will explore this problem further in the next section on "Assurance." A second problem was the virus threat: when we enforce MLS information flow we do nothing to prevent a virus introduced at a lower clearance level from propagating into higher clearance levels. Finally, the end user community found a number of cases where that the Bell-LaPadula model of information flow did not entirely satisfy their operational and security needs.

Self-replicating software like computer viruses became a minor phenomenon among the earliest home computer users in the late 1970s. While viruses weren't enough of a phenomenon to interest MLS researchers and developers, MLS systems caught the interest of the pioneering virus researcher Fred Cohen (1990, 1994). In 1984 he demonstrated that a virus inserted at the unclassified level of a system that implemented the Bell-LaPadula model could rapidly spread throughout all security levels of a system. This particular infestation did not reflect a bug in the MLS implementation. Instead, it indicated a flaw in the Bell-LaPadula model, which strives to allow information flows from low to high while preventing flows from high to low. Viruses represent a security threat that exploits an information flow from low to high, so MLS protection based on Bell-LaPadula gives no protection against it.

Viruses represented one case in which the Bell-LaPadula model did not meet the end users' operational and security needs. Additional cases emerged as end users gained experience with MLS systems. One problem was that the systems tended to collect a lot of "overclassified" information. Whenever a user created a document at a high security level, the document would have to retain that security level even if the user removed all sensitive information in order to create a less-classified or even unclassified document. In essence, end users often needed a mechanism to "downgrade" information so its label reflected its lowered sensitivity.

The downgrading problem became especially important as end users sought to develop "sensor to shooter" systems. These systems would use highly classified intelligence data to produce tactical commands to be sent to combat units whose radios received information at the Secret level or lower (see the later section on "Sensor to Shooter"). In practice, systems would address the downgrading problem by installing privileged programs that bypassed the MLS mechanism to downgrade information. While this served as a convenient patch to correct the problem, it also showed that practical systems did not entirely rely on the Bell-LaPadula mechanisms that had cost so much to build and validate. This further eroded the defense community's interest in MLS based on Bell-LaPadula products.

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